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ABSTRACT: Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it 
is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long 
after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of 
Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we 
almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates 
of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate relations to us to guarantee our survival. 
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§1 Introduction 
 
The future looks grim. We all will die: Our consciousness will fade, our memories vanish, our 
bodies disintegrate, and the particles that made up our bodies disperse into far-off corners of space. 
But what if at some point in the distant future there will be an exact duplicate of you just as you 
were shortly before your death with your brain and all life functions intact? This person will think 
about the same things you were thinking about, pursue the same goals, and perhaps even finish the 
article you were writing. In this paper, I will show that it follows from Statistical Mechanics and 
Cosmology that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be such duplicates of us in the distant 
future long after our deaths. Moreover, I will argue that these duplicates are suitably related to us 
to plausibly guarantee our survival. In particular, I will show that if survival of death is possible at 
all, then all of us will almost surely survive our death. So there is good news after all.1  
 
 
§2 Boltzmann Duplicates 
 
Thermodynamics describes the behavior of macroscopic systems in terms of quantities such as 
heat, pressure, temperature, and, most importantly, entropy. Entropy corresponds to the amount of 
a system's energy that can be extracted for mechanical work and, very roughly, measures the 
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similar result follows from assumptions in Statistical Mechanics and Cosmology.  
2 
system's degree of disorder. The Second Law of Thermodynamics says that the entropy of a closed 
system never decreases and typically increases. It predicts for example, that a gas released into a 
box will disperse; that ice cubes at room temperature will melt; and that we will be older in the 
future.   
 The Second Law of Thermodynamics, however, is only a probabilistic law. Work by 
Ludwig Boltzmann (and others) in Statistical Mechanics, which aims to ground Thermodynamics 
in fundamental physics, shows that entropy decrease is not impossible but merely extremely 
unlikely (see, e.g., Albert 2000: chapter 3, and Loewer 2012: 122). So there is a non-zero chance 
for the entropy of a physical system to decrease. Statistical Mechanics accounts for why we never 
witness entropy-decreasing behavior because the probability that such behavior occurs within a 
time period that is small relative to a cosmic scale is extremely low (Callender 2011: 89).   
 However, a plausible cosmological assumption is that our universe is temporally infinite. 
Statistical Mechanics predicts that the entropy of our universe is extremely likely to keep increasing 
until it reaches a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, which has maximal entropy. But once it has 
reached equilibrium, there still is a non-zero chance that fluctuations from thermodynamic 
equilibrium into states of lower entropy will happen. In fact Poincare’s recurrence theorem says 
that if our universe is appropriately bounded, then it is extremely likely to come arbitrarily close to 
every possible macrostate.2 So it is extremely likely that over an infinite amount of time every 
possible fluctuation into states of lower entropy will happen, including fluctuations that lead to 
pianos, solitary brains (“Boltzmann brains”), fully-formed persons, and entire galaxies. It might 
take billions of years until any particular such fluctuation will occur, but it will almost certainly 
occur eventually.  
 This consequence might strike you as outlandish, but contemporary cosmologists take it 
very seriously. Here is what Sean Carroll writes: 
 
If we wait long enough, our universe will empty out until it looks like de Sitter space with a tiny 
temperature, and stay that way forever. There will be random fluctuations in the thermal radiation 
that lead to all sorts of unlikely events—including the spontaneous generation of galaxies, planets, 
and Boltzmann brains. The chance that any one such thing happens at any particular time is small, 
but we have an eternity to wait, so every allowed thing will happen. (Carroll 2010: 313)  
 
It thus follows from Statistical Mechanics and plausible cosmological assumptions that there 
almost surely will be entropy-decreasing fluctuations that lead to exact duplicates of myself just as 
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I was shortly before my death.3 Call these persons “Boltzmann duplicates” and circumstances 
where there is a Boltzmann duplicate of me after my death “Boltzmann duplication.” It will be 
billions of years from now until such a duplicate has any significant chance of coming about, but 
it will almost surely come about eventually. The question then is whether the existence of future 
Boltzmann duplicates of me entails that I will survive my death. 
 
§3 Boltzmann Duplicates and Survival 
 
In this section, I will show that according to some influential versions of the psychological 
continuity view we survive our deaths in cases of Boltzmann duplication. This result is significant 
for two reasons. First, it shows that there are plausible accounts of survival according to which we 
would survive Boltzmann duplication and, hence, almost certainly survive our deaths. Second, I 
will show that the only accounts according to which we do not survive Boltzmann duplication are 
accounts according to which survival of death is impossible. So Boltzmann duplication shows that 
the physics is as kind to our survival as it possibly can be. If we still do not survive death, then it 
is only because the conceptual requirements on survival are so strict that survival of death is 
impossible even in principle. In other words, if survival of death is possible at all, then we survive 
our deaths in cases of Boltzmann duplication.  
 Most people find it natural that survival consists in the continuation of one's psychology in 
the future (see Nichols and Bruno 2010). This “psychological continuity view” can be motivated 
with cases like the following:  
 
Transporter. “The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the 
exact states of all of my cells. It will then transmit this information by radio. Travelling at the speed 
of light, the message will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. This will then create, 
out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine.” (Parfit 1984: 178) 
 
It is plausible that I would survive Transporter as the person who wakes up on Mars, even though 
my brain and my body will be destroyed. The psychological continuity view accounts for this 
judgment because the person who wakes up on Mars has a similar psychology as I (due to being 
an exact duplicate) and, moreover, her psychology is appropriately related to mine (due to the radio 
transmission). So the person on Mars continues my psychology in the future. In the following, I 
will argue that most versions of the psychological continuity theory predict that I survive my death 
                                                
3 Cosmologists worry about the troubling epistemological implications of this fact. The worry is that 
there will be fluctuations that lead to exact duplicates of our brains (“Boltzmann brains”) who have the 
exact same qualitative experiences as we have now. Moreover, there will be many more Boltzmann 
brains than regular observers. How then can I know that I am not a Boltzmann brain, in which case all 
of my memories and beliefs, including those that seem to confirm modern Cosmology, would be 
false? Cosmologists try to avoid this skeptical scenario, but none of the solutions would rule out these 
fluctuations entirely.  
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in at least some cases of Boltzmann duplication. 
 
§3.1 Psychological Sequentialism 
 
Different versions of the psychological continuity view disagree about when a person’s future 
psychology is appropriately related to my current psychology to facilitate survival. The most 
permissive psychological continuity view is “psychological sequentialism.” In Transporter, the 
Mars person's psychology causally depends on my current psychology because the transporter 
sends the information from my body scan to Mars where my body is replicated based on this 
information. However, according to psychological sequentialism, we would survive cases like 
Transporter even if there were no causal connection and the psychological similarity were merely 
a coincidence (see Campbell 2008, Elliot 1991, and Kolak and Martin 1987). Campbell describes 
this view as follows:  
 
[S]trictly speaking, a causal connection is not a part of what matters in survival. The only acceptable 
‘‘substitute’’ for it, though, is an incredible coincidence which results in exactly the same situation 
occurring as the appropriate causal connection would have produced. Such a coincidence is, of course, 
almost impossibly rare (and, practically speaking, would never occur), but that does not make it true that 
a causal connection is necessary. (Campbell 2008: 393)  
 
So even if the person on Mars had been randomly generated (without using the information from 
my body scan) and merely happened to have the same psychology as I, I would still survive as the 
person who awakes on Mars (Campbell 2008: 381–383). In absence of any causal connection this 
psychological match, of course, would be an incredible coincidence.  
 Psychological sequentialism entails that Boltzmann duplication guarantees survival. 
Boltzmann duplicates are psychologically perfectly similar to me. They have the same beliefs, 
desires, and behavioral dispositions as I had before my death. So if this similarity is all that matters 
for survival, their existence guarantees my survival. Boltzmann duplicates exemplify the rare 
coincidences that Campbell is talking about in the above quote, though he is wrong that they 
“practically speaking” would never occur. Over an infinite amount of time incredible coincidences 
do happen. So there is at least one theory of survival according to which we would 
straightforwardly survive as our Boltzmann duplicates. 
 
§3.2 The Widest Causal View 
 
Most psychological continuity views, however, are causal theories that require that my future 
psychology causally depends on my current psychology. In what follows, I will show that we still 
would survive Boltzmann duplication according to those causal theories that allow for the survival 
of death at least in principle. 
 The most permissive causal view of survival is the “widest causal view” (see Parfit 1984: 
283–287). It says that any kind of causal relation between my current self and my future self is 
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appropriate to secure psychological continuity. It might seem as if there is no causal relation 
between my current psychology and the psychology of any of my Boltzmann duplicates. After all, 
these duplicates arise from fluctuations out of thermodynamic equilibrium billions of years after 
my death. By this time all macroscopic traces of my current psychology will be long gone, 
including my brain, the brains of anybody remembering me, or any scans of my brain. But I will 
argue that my current psychology nonetheless very likely causes the psychology of at least some 
of my Boltzmann duplicates. 
 A widely accepted sufficient condition for causation is counterfactual dependence such that 
for two distinct occurring events C and E, C is a cause of E if: If C had not occurred, then E would 
not have occurred (Hall 2005; Lewis 1986a: 563). So to show that my psychology causes the 
psychology of one of my Boltzmann duplicates, it is enough to show that for sufficiently many 
pairs of mental states Mn and Mn*, where Mn is a mental state of mine and Mn* a corresponding 
mental state of my duplicate, the following counterfactuals are true: If my mental state M1 had not 
occurred, then mental state M1* of my Boltzmann duplicate would not have occurred; and if my 
mental state M2 had not occurred, then mental state M2* of my Boltzmann duplicate would not 
have occurred; and so on for sufficiently many pairs of mental states. For example, it needs to be 
the case that if I had not seen a white light just prior to my death, then my future Boltzmann 
duplicate would not have remembered seeing such a light.4 
 Some stage setting will be needed to show that sufficiently many of these counterfactuals 
are indeed true for at least some of my Boltzmann duplicates. I am making three background 
assumptions. First, I am adopting a standard recipe for determining the truth values of 
counterfactuals that goes back to Maudlin (2007: 21–34) and has been adapted for the needs of 
counterfactual accounts of causation by Paul and Hall (2013). According to this recipe, we 
determine the truth value of “if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred” as follows: 
 
[C]onstruct a counterfactual state of the world at time t as much like the actual state at time t as possible, save 
for the fact that C does not occur. Think of taking the actual time-t state of the world, and ringing carefully 
localized changes on it just sufficient to make it the case that C does not occur. […] We then evolve the resulting 
state forward in time, in accordance with the actual laws of nature. If the resulting history yields E, the 
conditional is false; otherwise it is true. (Paul and Hall 2013: 47–48) 
 
This recipe provides a way of determining whether a mental state M* of my Boltzmann duplicate 
counterfactually depends on my mental state M: Take the entire state of the world at the time of M 
and make localized changes such that M no longer occurs.5 Then evolve the resulting state of the 
world forward in time in accordance with the laws of nature. If M* does not occur in the resulting 
history, then M* counterfactually depends on M. 
 Second, I am assuming that all mental events, including my and my Boltzmann duplicate’s 
                                                
4 There are issues about how to characterize memories without already presupposing facts about 
personal identity. See Parfit (1984) for discussion. 
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such as M when we make these changes. How this issue is resolved will not matter for my argument.  
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mental states, supervene on physical events. This supervenience entails that if we take the current 
state of the world and make localized changes such that some mental state M does not occur, the 
resulting state will be a different physical state than the original state. The supervenience of the 
mental on the physical is widely accepted.  
 Third, I will assume that the fundamental dynamical laws of physics are deterministic in 
both temporal directions. If the physical laws are deterministic in this sense, then the complete 
physical state of the world at any one time fixes a unique future and a unique past. So any world 
that differs from the actual world with respect to its physical state at any one time also differs from 
it at any other time. Many of our best past and present candidates for the fundamental dynamical 
laws of physics are deterministic in this sense.6   
 These three assumptions entail that my current mental states prior to my death cause events 
in the distant future at the time when my Boltzmann duplicate forms. If mental-physical 
supervenience holds, then a state of the world that is as much like the actual current state as 
possible, save for the fact that some mental state of mine does not occur, is physically different. If 
determinism is true, then evolving this different physical state forward in accordance with the laws 
of nature also yields a different physical state of the world billions of years later at the time when 
my Boltzmann duplicate forms. Because this physical state is different from the actual physical 
state at the time, it does not contain certain events that actually occur. Hence, in accordance with 
the above recipe for evaluating counterfactuals, these actual events counterfactually depend on my 
current mental state. This argument shows that my current mental states cause events at the time of 
my Boltzmann duplicate, though it does not say which events.  
 It then remains to be shown that my current mental states cause the right events at the time 
of my Boltzmann duplicate. Specifically, sufficiently many of my current mental states have to 
cause the corresponding mental states of my Boltzmann duplicate. I will show that this likely is the 
case for at least some of my Boltzmann duplicates. Establishing this point requires some 
background about the physics of entropy-decreasing fluctuations. Boltzmann duplicates come into 
existence due to fluctuations from a state of thermodynamic equilibrium into a state of lower 
entropy that contains a fully formed person who is an exact duplicate of me. Consider a particular 
Boltzmann duplicate and the earlier microstate of thermodynamic equilibrium that leads to it via 
an entropy-decreasing fluctuation. Call this earlier microstate “S.” Boltzmannian Statistical 
Mechanics entails that S is an extremely atypical microstate. We can represent all possible 
microstates that are consistent with thermodynamic equilibrium as a region in an abstract space 
called “phase space” and put a natural measure over this region. According to this natural measure, 
the overwhelming majority of microstates in this region evolve into states in their immediate future 
that also are in thermodynamic equilibrium. Only a tiny proportion of microstates fluctuate into a 
                                                
6 My argument could be adapted for the case that the laws are indeterministic, but things would be more 
complicated. If the laws are indeterministic, it still is plausible that a different present state of the 
world would entail a different probability distribution over its state at all future times. But one would 
then need a recipe for evaluating counterfactuals given indeterminism (see Maudlin 2007: 30–31 for 
discussion). 
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state of lower entropy in their immediate future, and only an even smaller proportion lead to an 
exact duplicate of me. So S is a highly atypical microstate because the overwhelming majority of 
macroscopically indistinguishable microstates do not fluctuate into a state of lower entropy in their 
immediate future. Moreover, the overall majority of microstates in phase space that are in the 
immediate vicinity of S also do not fluctuate into states of lower entropy in their immediate future. 
The property of leading to a state of lower entropy in the immediate future thus is extremely 
sensitive against small perturbations (cf. Albert 2000: 151 who uses the same observation for a 
different purpose). 
 It follows that any difference to S almost certainly would have made it that my Boltzmann 
duplicate would not have formed. The number of microstates that lead to a Boltzmann duplicate in 
their immediate future is vanishingly small, both compared to the entirety of possible equilibrium 
microstates and compared to the states in S’s immediate vicinity in phase space. So a physical state 
that differs from S in even the smallest respect almost certainly would be a microstate that would 
not fluctuate into a lower-entropy state that contains a perfect duplicate of me in its immediate 
future. 
 I have shown above that each one of my mental states causes at least a tiny difference to 
the physical state of the world at any future time; hence, it also causes at least a tiny physical 
difference in S. And I have just shown that any tiny difference in S is likely to make it that it no 
longer leads to a Boltzmann duplicate of me in its immediate future. But if my duplicate had not 
formed in the first place, then none of its mental states would have occurred. Hence, it is very likely 
that if any one of my current mental states had not occurred, then none of the mental states of my 
Boltzmann duplicate would have occurred. So each one of my current mental states likely is a cause 
of all of the mental states of my Boltzmann duplicate.  
 My argument is probabilistic: for any Boltzmann duplicate of me it is very likely that each 
one of my current mental states causes every mental state of this Boltzmann duplicate. Of course, 
it might turn out that for a particular duplicate none of my mental states are among the causes of 
its mental states, or that some but not all are. But given the numerous Boltzmann duplicates of me 
that will almost surely occur in the future, it is extremely likely that at least some of these duplicates 
are such that each one of my current mental states causes all of their mental states. In fact, if time 
is infinite (as I am assuming), then all my argument requires is that there is a non-zero chance for 
such a Boltzmann duplicate to form. Over an infinite amount of time there then almost surely will 
be at least one actual such duplicate. 
 Boltzmann duplication then guarantees my survival according to the widest causal version 
of the psychological continuity view as long as there is at least one such duplicate, which is 
extremely likely. Since each of my current mental states causes all of the mental states of this 
duplicate, it is, a fortiori, true that each of my mental states causes the corresponding mental state 
of my duplicate. For example, my experience of seeing a white light just prior to my death causes 
a corresponding memory in my Boltzmann duplicate.  
 One might object that the argument equally shows that every other present event almost 
certainly causes all of the mental states of at least one of my Boltzmann duplicates. For example, 
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if the cup on my desk were positioned differently, then the physical state of the world at the time 
shortly before some Boltzmann duplicate of me forms also would have been different. And this 
difference probably would have made it that the duplicate would not have formed in the first place.  
 This consequence of my argument, however, is not an objection. We know from the 
literature on causation that events have vastly more causes than we ordinarily think or would 
mention in an explanation (Lewis 1986b: 214–216). And this is especially true for very sensitive 
outcomes, such as the formation of my Boltzmann duplicates, whose occurrence depends on a 
conspiracy between numerous different factors. The widest causal view only requires that my 
current psychology is a cause of my Boltzmann duplicate’s psychology. And my argument shows 
that this is almost certainly the case for at least some duplicates, regardless of what other causes 
these duplicates’ mental states may have in addition.  
 
§3.3 The Wide Causal View 
 
A more restrictive psychological continuity view of survival is the “wide causal view” (cf. Parfit 
1984: 207). It says that not just any causal relations can facilitate survival but only causal relations 
that meet certain formal constraints. There is no agreement on what these constraints are. But a 
standard proposal is that causal relations need to be reliable and law-like in order to facilitate 
survival. In this section, I will argue that Boltzmann duplication conforms to a plausible 
interpretation of these constraints that captures the main motivation behind the wide causal view.  
 It may initially seem as if the causal relations in Boltzmann duplication are not reliable and 
law-like in the required sense. It is natural to understand the idea that causal relations are reliable 
in terms of the counterfactual insensitivity of the corresponding causal claims. Following 
Woodward (2006: 2), a “causal claim is insensitive to the extent to which it would continue to hold 
under various sorts of changes in the actual circumstances.” So my current mental state M causes 
a mental state M* of my Boltzmann duplicate reliably, just in case the claim “M causes M*” would 
continue to hold under various sorts of changes in the actual circumstances. By contrast, a causal 
relation is unreliable if the corresponding causal claim “holds in the actual circumstances but would 
not continue to hold in circumstances that depart in various ways from the actual circumstances.” 
(Woodward 2006: 2)  
 Law-likeness can be understood as the requirement that a causal relation between two token 
events needs to be part of a law-like causal pattern at the type level. If there is a law-like relation 
between my mental states and my Boltzmann duplicate’s mental states, then it is not just the case 
that my actual mental states cause corresponding mental states of my duplicate. It also needs to be 
the case that if my mental states were different, my different mental states would cause 
correspondingly different mental states of my duplicate. For example, if I had memories of growing 
up in China, then these memories would cause my future duplicate to also have memories of 
growing up in China. Reliability and law-likeness are different properties. A causal relation 
between two token events might be reliable without it being the case that other tokens of the first 
type also would cause tokens of the second type.  
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 The causal relations in Boltzmann duplication are not reliable and law-like in the above 
sense. Fluctuations from equilibrium that create Boltzmann duplicates are extremely sensitive 
against small changes in current circumstances. So if the present circumstances had been even 
slightly different, any particular fluctuation almost certainly would not have happened. In such 
circumstances none of my actual duplicates would have formed and, hence, none of their mental 
states would have occurred. Hence, causal claims such as “my current mental state M causes mental 
state M* of my duplicate” would have been false in these circumstances. Moreover, if my current 
mental states had been different (say, if my memories had been different), then the fluctuations that 
create my actual duplicates almost certainly also would not have happened. My different mental 
states would then not have caused correspondingly different mental states in my duplicate because 
my duplicate would likely not have existed. So it might seem as if I do not survive Boltzmann 
duplication according to the wide causal view of psychological continuity. This conclusion, 
however, would be premature. 
 I will argue that there is an important sense in which the causal mechanism in Boltzmann 
duplication is reliable and law-like and that this sense suffices for Boltzmann duplication to accord 
with the main motivation behind the wide causal view. The following analogy will motivate this 
point. Consider a transportation device similar to the one described in Transporter. This device 
scans your body, destroys it, and radio-transmits information about your body to a different place 
where an exact replica is created. The modified transportation device, however, is peculiar in that 
where and when your duplicate will be created depends on your exact mental states and the exact 
circumstances at the time when you enter the device. For example, given your actual mental states 
and circumstances, the device will create a duplicate of you on Mars five minutes after the scan. 
But if your mental states or the circumstances had been even slightly different (say, if the air 
pressure had been a bit higher or your memories had been slightly different), the device would have 
sent the information from your scan to a different place (such as Venus) where a replica of you 
would have been created at a different time. 
 In this modified transporter scenario your actual mental states cause the corresponding 
mental states of your duplicate on Mars. These causal relations, however, are not reliable and law-
like in the above sense. They are not reliable in the above sense because if you had entered the 
device in different circumstances, then your Mars duplicate would not have existed, and so your 
mental states would not have caused any of your duplicate’s mental states. And the causal relations 
are not law-like in the above sense because if you had entered the transporter with different mental 
states, then there also would not have been a duplicate of you on Mars. Your mental states, thus, 
would not have caused correspondingly different mental states in your duplicate on Mars.  
 Nonetheless there is a sense in which the causal mechanism in the modified transporter case 
is reliable and law-like. If circumstances had been different, then your mental states would not have 
caused the future mental state tokens that they actually cause. However, the device then would have 
created a different duplicate at a different place and time, and your mental states would have caused 
mental state tokens of the same types in this duplicate. Hence, while your mental states do not 
reliably cause the mental state tokens that they actually cause, they reliable cause tokens of the 
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relevant types. Similarly, if your mental states had been different, these different mental states 
would have caused correspondingly different mental state tokens in some duplicate of you 
somewhere in the future. For example, if you had entered the transporter with different memories 
(say of growing up in China), then no duplicate of you with these memories would have formed on 
Mars; but your different memories then would have caused corresponding memories in a duplicate 
that would have formed somewhere else. So, there is a reliable and law-like causal mechanism in 
virtue of which your current mental states cause future mental states of a particular type. 
 Proponents of the wide causal view should say that because of this reliable and law-like 
causal mechanism, you survive entering the transportation device. The main motivation of the wide 
causal view is that it should not be an accident that your current psychology causes the continuation 
of your psychology in the future (see McKinnon and Bigelow 2001: 474; Parfit 1984: 286–287). 
The modified transportation case satisfies this requirement. The operative causal mechanism makes 
it entirely non-accidental that your current mental states cause future mental state tokens that are 
of the right type to continue your psychology. Your current psychology, hence, is guaranteed to 
cause its continuation in the future. It is accidental when and where your psychology will continue. 
But it is hard to see why this contingency should matter to your survival. For example, we can 
imagine that even in the original transportation case, where the scan of your body is always sent to 
Mars, it may be accidental when the scientists on Mars will get around to reproducing your body 
and where they will do so (for example, in which of several clinics). This contingency does not 
seem like a good reason for thinking that we would not survive the transport.  
 I will argue that we survive Boltzmann duplication according to the wide causal view 
because it involves the same kind of reliable and law-like causal mechanism as the modified 
transportation case. Your current mental states cause the future mental states of at least some of 
your Boltzmann duplicates. If current circumstances had been different, then almost certainly none 
of your actual future duplicates would have formed. So your mental states would not have caused 
the same future token mental states. However, my argument in §3.2 shows that in such 
counterfactual circumstances other fluctuations almost certainly would have created different 
duplicates of you (at different places and times), and your current mental states almost certainly 
would have caused the token mental states of at least some of these duplicates. Consequently, if 
current circumstances had been different, your mental states still would have caused future mental 
state tokens of the same types as they actually cause. Similarly, if (for example) your memories 
had been different, the fluctuations in these counterfactual circumstances also almost certainly 
would have led to the formation of other duplicates of you (at different places and times). Your 
memories then almost certainly would have caused corresponding memories in at least one of these 
duplicates. So we find the same kind of reliable and law-like causal mechanism in Boltzmann 
duplication as in the transportation case. In particular, your mental states causally guarantee that 
your psychology continues in the future by causing, across a wide range of counterfactual 
circumstances, future mental state tokens of the right types to continue your psychology. This 
causal mechanism then guarantees your survival according to the wide causal view.  
 A worry about this argument is that in Boltzmann duplication the fact that you have some 
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psychological duplicate in the future (somewhere, sometime) does not counterfactually depend on 
your current mental states. If your current mental states had not occurred, then the particular future 
duplicates (and their token mental states) that your current mental states cause would not have 
occurred. However, chance fluctuations in these counterfactual circumstances almost certainly 
would have created other duplicates with the same types of mental states, and so your psychology 
still would have continued. One then might take this lack of counterfactual dependence to shows 
that your current mental states are not causally responsible for the continuation of your psychology 
in the future. How then can Boltzmann duplication constitute survival according to the wide causal 
view?  
In reply, I argue that survival according to the wide causal view does not require that the 
type-level fact that you have some psychological duplicate (somewhere, sometime) 
counterfactually depends on your current mental sates. Boltzmann duplication is a case of survival 
according to the wide causal view because of a reliable and law-like causal mechanism at the token-
level. Your current mental states cause the token mental states of at least some of your future 
Boltzmann duplicates; and if circumstances had been different, your mental states still would have 
caused corresponding token mental states in at least some of your Boltzmann duplicates in these 
counterfactual circumstances. Due to these token-level causal relations, your current mental states 
causally guarantee that there will be token mental states in the future that are of the right types to 
continue your psychology. The existence of these causal relations is fully compatible with the fact 
that in the absence of your mental states, other processes (in the form of fluctuations) still would 
have caused other psychological duplicates of you. So the continuation of your psychology in the 
future does not counterfactually depend on your current mental states. But this fact is irrelevant for 
the existence of a reliable and law-like causal mechanism at the token-level, and so it is irrelevant 
for your survival according to the wide causal view. 
 An analogy with the transportation case will illustrate this irrelevance of counterfactual 
dependence at the type-level for survival. Imagine a transportation device where entering the 
transporter causes the creation of a duplicate of you in the future. As before, it is part of how the 
transporter works that where and when it will create this duplicate depends on the exact 
circumstances at the time when you enter the device. I have argued above that according to the 
wide causal view we would survive entering this transporter. But now suppose further that, in 
addition to the duplicate created by the transporter, another duplicate of you will be created in the 
distant future regardless of whether you enter the transporter. The creation of this duplicate is a 
mere coincidence and does not causally depend on your entering the transporter or even the 
existence of your current mental states. With this modification added, entering the device still 
causes a duplicate of you somewhere in the future regardless of your exact circumstances and exact 
mental states. But it is now the case that if none of your current mental states had occurred, there 
still would have been a duplicate of you in the future because the coincidental duplicate still would 
have existed. So the case is analogous to Boltzmann duplication in that the type-level fact that you 
have some psychological duplicate in the future (somewhere, sometime) does not counterfactually 
depend on your current mental states. 
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The presence of this additional duplicate, however, does not matter for survival according 
to the wide causal view. All that matters for survival is the reliability and law-likeness of the causal 
mechanism that sends your psychology into the future. The existence of the additional duplicate 
does not affect this causal mechanism. Entering the transportation device still causally guarantees 
that there will be mental state tokens in the future that continue your psychology by causing the 
creation of a future duplicate of you. And it does so regardless of whether some other future 
duplicate of you would still have existed if your mental states had not occurred. It, therefore, is 
irrelevant to survival according to the wide causal view whether the fact that you have some 
duplicate (somewhere, sometime) in the future counterfactually depends on your current mental 
states. Boltzmann duplication then also constitutes survival according to the wide causal view 
because it is exactly analogous to this version of the transportation case. 
 
§3.4 Impossible Criteria 
  
I have shown that Boltzmann duplication guarantees survival according to several versions of the 
psychological continuity view. However, there is one last version according to which Boltzmann 
duplication would not be a case of survival. This version holds that survival requires the same kinds 
of causal relations that are present in ordinary cases of survival. Peter Unger characterizes this 
“narrow causal view” as follows: 
 
[F]or a person to survive, some of her psychology, her core psychology, must be carried forward in ways 
that are, on the whole, not terribly different from the ways that psychological continuity is achieved in 
ordinary cases. (Unger 1990: 70)  
This view, for example, predicts that Transportation is not a case of survival because the radio-
transmission that sends our psychology to Mars is unlike the causal processes involved in ordinary 
cases of survival.  
 According to the narrow causal view, Boltzmann duplication would not be a case of 
survival. The causal relations that connect our current psychological states to those of our 
Boltzmann duplicates in the future are certainly different from the causal relations involved in 
ordinary survival. Ordinary survival minimally involves the continued existence of one’s brain, but 
your brain will be long decayed by the time a Boltzmann duplicate of you might form. 
 That Boltzmann duplication would not guarantee survival according to the narrow causal 
view, however, does not diminish its relevance for the question of whether we will survive our 
deaths. Death, according to a standard definition, involves the irreversible cessation of the 
functioning of the entire brain. So death, unsurprisingly, prevents the causal processes involved in 
ordinary survival. The narrow causal view, since it says that survival requires the same causal 
processes involved in ordinary cases of survival, thus entails that surviving death is conceptually 
impossible. Hence, it then comes as little surprise that Boltzmann duplication would not be a case 
of surviving death. Nothing is. 
 Boltzmann duplication is interesting because it entails that we almost certainly will survive 
our deaths according to plausible theories that do allow the survival of death. Survival of death, if 
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possible, thus is not a distant or outlandish possibility. On the contrary, Boltzmann duplication 
shows that all the physical facts that our survival would require are actually in place. The physical 
facts are such that if survival of death is conceptually possible, then it almost certainly is actual. If 
we still do not survive death, then only because it is a conceptual impossibility. I will address 
possible objections to my argument in the next section.  
 
§4 Objections and Replies 
 
§4.1 Biological Criteria 
 
So far I have only considered psychological continuity theories of survival. The first objection 
consists in denying that psychological continuity of any form suffices for survival. In particular, 
defenders of biological criteria argue that a person survives just in case the biological organism 
that constitutes her persists (see, e.g., Olson 2007). The objection then is that according to this 
biological approach Boltzmann duplication would not constitute survival because it would not 
secure the continued existence of my biological organism.  
 My reply is that the dialectic does not change significantly if we shift to a biological 
approach. After all, my Boltzmann duplicate also is biologically indistinguishable from me, save 
for its causal history. The question is then what kinds of relations can facilitate that I survive as a 
biologically similar self in the future. Either, we hold a “narrow biological view” that says that only 
the kinds of causal relations involved in ordinary cases of survival can carry a biological organism 
toward the future. In that case, survival of death is conceptually impossible just like on the narrow 
psychological view. Or, we allow that mere sequence, any causal relations, or reliable and law-like 
causal relations can also facilitate the persistence of my biological organism. In this case, it is 
plausible that Boltzmann duplication would constitute survival even according to the biological 
approach. My Boltzmann duplicate has all of the same biological functions as me. Moreover, the 
above arguments, mutatis mutandis, would show that my current biological features stand in the 
appropriate relations to the biological features of my Boltzmann duplicates. 
 
§4.2 Externalism 
 
The second objection says that I do not survive Boltzmann duplication because the duplicate would 
not have my psychology. Externalists about mental content argue that the content of mental states, 
such as beliefs and memories, is (partly) grounded in their causal history. For example, my memory 
of visiting Paris is only about Paris if it stands in an appropriate causal relation to the city. The 
objection then is that the mental states of my Boltzmann duplicate would lack the right causal 
history and so would not be about the same things as my mental states. My mental states have 
arisen from interactions with cities and people; my duplicate's mental states have arisen from 
crawling out of equilibrium soup. Hence, my duplicate does not have the same psychology as I.  
 I have two replies: First, many philosophers recently have argued that at least some aspect 
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of content does supervene on the intrinsic features of an agent regardless of causal history (see Lau 
and Deutsch 2014, section 3). In this case, my Boltzmann duplicate would be psychologically 
similar to me even if his mental states lack a suitable causal history. Second, even if externalism is 
true, it is plausible that my duplicate inherits the externalist content of my mental states, at least in 
cases where her mental states are caused by my psychology. As an analogy, suppose an Egyptian 
slave carves “Ramses oppressor” into a clay vase. Through a long-winded and improbable causal 
history, I find the vase thousands of years later and form the belief that Ramses was an oppressor. 
It seems that my belief would be about the same person as the slave's belief although the causal 
link is very weak. Similarly, my duplicate's mental states plausibly are about the same things as my 
mental states merely due to having been caused by my mental states.   
 
§4.3 Fission 
 
A third objection is that there could be multiple Boltzmann duplicate of me at the same time. This 
fact gives rise to what the literature calls “fission,” where more than one person is psychologically 
continuous with me. Fission raises the worry that psychological continuity may not suffice for 
survival. After all, it would be arbitrary to say that in a case of fission you are identical to one of 
your successors but not the others, yet it also seems that you cannot be identical to more than one 
person at once.  
 My response is that I can use any one of the moves that defenders of psychological 
continuity theories make in response to fission cases. My preferred response is that identity is not 
necessary for survival. In cases where two Boltzmann duplicates at the same time are 
psychologically continuous with me, I survive as both people, though I am not identical to either. 
The existence of these duplicates nonetheless constitutes my survival because each person is a 
fitting object for my selfish concerns (Parfit 1984). Alternatively, one can consistently describe 
fission cases as involving multiple persons even before the fission, and hence maintain that survival 
requires identity, by adopting an ontology of temporal parts (Lewis 1976).  
 
§5 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive death 
because we almost surely have Boltzmann duplicates in our future. As a consequence, our lives 
will carry on infinitely because there will always be another duplicate in the future that will 
continue your thoughts and carry on your life projects. What then is the catch? Apart from the fact 
that living forever might have disadvantages of its own, most Boltzmann duplicates will be lonely 
creatures floating in empty space (as these are the most minimal entropy-decreasing fluctuations) 
who will soon suffer whatever ill fate awaits humans in a vacuum. Some duplicates, however, will 
have fully-formed galaxies around them and live for much longer. And even short-lived duplicates 
ultimately survive because there almost surely will be another suitable Boltzmann duplicate of 
them in the future.  
15 
Acknowledgments. Anna Smajdor first got me thinking about the issues in this paper. She 
speculated that over an infinite span of time it may become a certainty that the particles that 
currently compose our bodies, due to statistical mechanical chances, rearrange themselves into the 
exactly same configuration in the distant future. My paper pursues a somewhat similar idea. I also 
would like to thank Anna Smajdor, Craig Callender, Andreas Hüttemann, Siegfried Jaag, and two 
anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments and suggestions.  
 
 
References 
 
Albrecht, A., and Sorbo, L. (2004) “Can the Universe Afford Inflation?,” Physical Review D 70: 
63528. 
Albert, D. (2000) Time and Chance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Boddy, K., Carroll, S., and Pollack, J. (2016) “De Sitter Space Without Dynamical Quantum 
Fluctuations,” Foundations of Physics 46: 702.  
Callender, C. (2011) “The Past History of Molecules,” in: Beisbart, C. and S. Hartmann (eds.), 
Probabilities in Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 83–113. 
Campbell, S. (2005) “Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?,” Philosophical 
Studies 126: 375–396. 
Carroll, S. (2010) From Eternity to Here. New York: Dutton. 
Dyson, L., Kleban, M., and Susskind, L. (2002) “Disturbing Implications of a Cosmological 
Constant,” Journal of High Energy Physics 210: 011. 
Elliot, R. (1991) “Personal Identity and Causal Continuity,” Philosophical Quarterly 41: 55–75.  
Hall, N. (2005) “Causation,” in: Jackson, F. and M. Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 505-533.  
Kolak, D. and Martin, R. (1987) “Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 24: 339–347. 
Lau, J. and Deutsch, M. (2014) "Externalism About Mental Content", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/content-externalism/>. 
Lewis, D. (1976) “Survival and Identity,” in: Rorty, A. (ed.) The Identities of Persons. Berkeley: 
California. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Lewis, D. (1986a) “Causation,” in: his Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 159–213.  
Lewis, D. (1986b) “Causal Explanation,” in: his Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 214–240.  
16 
Lewis, D. (2004) “How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
82: 3–22. 
Lewis, P. (2000) “What Is It Like To Be Schrödinger's Cat?,” Analysis 60: 22–29. 
Loewer, B. (2012) “Two Accounts of Laws and Time,” Philosophical Studies 160: 115–137. 
Maudlin, T. (2007) The Metaphysics Within Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McKinnon, N., and Bigelow, J. (2001) “Parfit, Causation, and Survival” Philosophia 28: 467–476. 
Nichols, S. and Bruno, M. (2010) “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study,” 
Philosophical Psychology 23: 293–312. 
Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Paul, L.A., and Hall, N. (2013) Causation: A User’s Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Winsberg, E. (2012) “Bumps on the Road to Here (from Eternity),” Entropy 14: 390–406. 
Woodward, J. (2006) “Sensitive and Insensitive Causation,” Philosophical Review 115: 1–50.  
